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ABSTRACT 
 
 Since the mid 1990’s, the Government of Peru implemented private public 
partnership systems to deliver quality public infrastructure at a faster pace.  One of those 
systems, adopted in 2008 to accelerate the implementation of priority public infrastructure 
projects across the country is called "Works for Taxes" (“Obras por Impuestos”). This system 
allows any private company or consortium to finance and implement public infrastructure 
projects prioritized by any level of Government in Peru, and later recover the total amount of 
its investment as a credit when filing Corporate Income Tax.  
 Since its adoption in 2008, companies based in Peru have increasingly worked under 
this scheme. As of December 2017, 307 projects had been implemented using the system, for 
more than US$ 3.6 Billion, and involving 102 companies across different public infrastructure 
areas. The reasoning behind the system is that using it, the Government is able to forward 
financial resources required to complete prioritized projects from private companies paying 
corporate income tax in Peru, and to deliver these works faster than traditionally.  
 Under this system the private partner may choose –among government prioritized 
projects- to finance one or more works (e.g., a road needed near towns surrounding one of its 
locations, which will greatly benefit its workers’ families in the area but also their communities). 
In this thesis, I address the question of whether the Peruvian Works for Taxes system created 
in 2008 helped solve the infrastructure under provision problem or not. For this purpose, I 
carried out an observational longitudinal study over panel data containing information on all 
projects developed in Peru under this system, from its starting point in 2008 to December 
2017. Through this analysis I found that only after critical and successive legal adjustments, 
the system became able to serve its intended policy objective with increasing geographical 
reach and covering a widening variety of social services, though still with a limited number of 
participant companies.  
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 The correlation between system performance and critical legal adjustments identified 
over the period under study, suggests that trade in tax credits granted to participating 
companies, and the ease of issuance of such credit certification –which I analyze in their 
characteristics and find to be, functionally, a security- are key elements for further performance 
improvement.  
 Thus, I conclude that, notwithstanding the system’s performance improvement 
observed after five years of its creation, two elements of its current institutional design, namely 
i) the trading of tax credits certificates issued under it and ii) the predictability of timelines for 
the issuance of such credits, should undergo further institutional and practice adjustments for 
the system to better perform in Peru, and elsewhere, if it is considered and replicated to 
address similar infrastructure under provision concerns. I therefore propose that adjustments 
are made to have a freely tradable tax credit certificates –including those issued to contractors 
when they have the initiative or win the bid for some work under the program- and to 
incorporate a higher yielding tax credit certificate that, like a price system, could incentivize 
initiatives even in areas still not reached by the system or private investment.       
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Part I   
 
The Works for Taxes System: context and structure 
 
1. Introduction 
 After its dramatic economic stagnation during the 1970’s and 1980’s, one of the 
fundamental reforms for economic recovery carried out by Peru since the 1990s was the 
promotion of investment in basic infrastructure upgrading and delivery. Basic social 
infrastructure investment was understood as a means to increase integration, productivity and 
competitiveness in far regions of Peru, where services relatively well provided in cities were 
absent (Webb, 2013). During the 1990 and 2000 decades, the increasing provision of public 
services such as rural electricity –the operation of which was transferred to private providers- 
was critical to generate well recorded benefits for communities, greater productivity increases 
(Fernandez Baldor et. al, 2014), with most of them remaining in the rural sector (Morley, 2017).  
 
Since the mid 1990’s, the Government of Peru designed and put in place several private public 
partnership systems to deliver better infrastructure at a faster pace.  One of these 
systems, adopted in 2008 to accelerate the implementation of priority public infrastructure 
projects across the country is called "Works for Taxes" (“Obras por Impuestos”). It allows any 
private company or consortium to finance and implement public infrastructure projects 
prioritized by any level of Government in Peru, and later recover the total amount of its 
investment as a credit when filing Corporate Income Tax.  
 Since its adoption in 2008, companies based in Peru have increasingly worked under 
this scheme. As of December 2017, 307 projects had already been implemented using the 
system, for more than US$3.6 Billion, and involving 102 companies across different public 
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infrastructure areas. The reasoning behind the system is that using it, the Government is able 
to forward financial resources required to complete prioritized projects from private companies 
paying corporate income tax in Peru, and to deliver these works faster than traditionally.  
 Under this system the private partner may choose –among government prioritized 
projects- to finance one or more works of infrastructure identified as with potential to benefit 
communities in areas usually adjacent or near the place where the company operates some 
of its facilities. The company is therefore able to align its own interests with the public interest 
and delivering critical infrastructure and basic services to populations usually living outside the 
main Peruvian cities, where infrastructure under provision is a more tangible problem and still 
prevents sustained growth. 
  
 The objective of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the Peruvian Works for 
Taxes System in terms of regional coverage and identify potential hurdles for its performance. 
Therefore I will address the question of whether this system -created in 2008- has helped 
solve the Peruvian infrastructure under provision problem or not. For this purpose, I carry out 
an observational longitudinal study over panel data containing information on all projects 
developed in Peru under this system, from its starting point in 2008 to December 2017. I will 
also use a parallel chronological analysis of the legal instruments and practices issued to 
operate the system and of its performance. My central hypothesis is that the Works for Taxes 
system has delivered benefits in terms of helping close the Peruvian infrastructure gap and 
that further legal adjustments -regarding the issuance and trading of the tax credit certificates 
it offers- that were made to its design had a positive effect on its performance. I evaluate this 
performance in terms of geographical reach, investment and public and private participants. It 
must be noted as well that the cost effectiveness of each of the works prioritized under this 
system is pre evaluated by the Peruvian Ministry of Economy and Finance under a social 
profitability and lifecycle methodology1.   
                                                
1 A definition of the Peruvian Ministry of Economy methods followed to evaluate public investment is accessible 
at https://www.mef.gob.pe/es/inversion-publica-sp-21787/184-instrumentos-metodologicos/4514-metodologias. 
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 In Part I of this thesis I address the Works for Taxes system characteristics and 
operation. I start with a description of the seriously challenging topography of Peru and the 
substantial infrastructure gap that this natural feature, jointly with shortcomings in public 
management and economic constraints, is still causing. I later address the reaction of the 
Peruvian Government to this growing infrastructure gap, through the promotion of different 
public private partnerships, and then focus on the 2018 Works for Taxes program. On 
addressing this program, I present the profuse and successive amendments and detailed 
regulations it has had, indicating the rationale behind those. For a better understating of the 
figures on performance of the program, I explain the areas of infrastructure covered by the 
system, the procedure to be followed by investors participating in it and the benefits officially 
stated as its contributions to Peru, and key institutional elements in which the success of the 
system relies. 
 
 In Part II of this work, I use an observational longitudinal approach to analyze a data 
set containing detailed information on all projects carried out in Peru under the Works for 
Taxes system since its creation in 2008 until December 2017. I analyze this data in order to 
identify the geographical reach of the system, areas of public service covered, number and 
type of companies participating, growth of investment and beneficiaries, all at a department 
level and during the period under study. This allows me to evaluate the performance of the 
system in the task of helping Peru close the infrastructure gap it faces. 
   I also find that the relation between data trends on performance and the subsequent 
legal adjustments to the system structure reveals two elements of concern, namely i) the ease 
of trade of the tax credit certificates issued under the system, and ii) the predictability of the 
legal timeframes set for its issuance and use by the companies entitled to them. Regarding 
                                                
Even though they could also satisfy other metrics, for purposes of this work, and following the Works for Taxes 
legal requirements for pre viability declaration, we shall assume that all works carried out are socially profitable 
under this methodology. 
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these two elements, I offer two proposals for the improvement of the program in Peru or 
elsewhere, if any other country considered adjusting it to its reality. Namely, an open market 
of tax credit certificates and a pricing system to reach more costly, far infrastructure works.  
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2. A Portray of Peru 
The purpose of this section is to describe the difficulties of the Peruvian 
topography leading to high construction costs and under provision of basic 
infrastructure and services.  Peru is a country located in the central western 
coast of South America facing the Pacific Ocean on its western coast and 
sharing with Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, and Bolivia the lines of the Andes 
Mountains and with Brazil, an important portion of the immense rainforest 
Amazon jungle region. When the territory of Peru is analyzed transversally in 
terms of altitude, humidity among other constant conditions, three different 
regions emerge as its essential divisions, following the pattern described in 
the following chart.  
  
Chart 1. 
Peru:  Location and Basic Map 
 
        
 
Peru’s coastal region, which is mostly a dessert, is however naturally 
irrigated by dozens of river basins –separated by different distances- flowing 
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down from the Andes into the Pacific Ocean. Peruvian river basins also flow 
across steep Andes Mountains valleys into the Pacific Rim and also 
contributing to the basins going east, crossing Peru’s rainforest region and 
contributing to lakes and some neighboring countries naturally endowed water 
sources.  
 
During the twentieth century, further analysis on this division was 
made, identifying 8 clearly distinguishable life zones along the three basic 
regions (Pulgar Vidal, 1938). Contemporary studies build on the complexity 
and difficulty for integration of the Peruvian geography this biological division 
suggests.   
 
Chart 2. Peru Life Zones  
 
Source: Instituto Geofísico del Perú  
 
A logical consequence of these physical characteristics a higher cost of 
building infrastructure in regions where geographical difficulty is more 
pronounced, namely, those in the Andes Mountains and those in the 
rainforest region. Since the independence of Peru in 1821, integration through 
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infrastructure, first with railroads then with roads, was a priority of subsequent 
administrations and works were made, but as of 2017 it remained a central 
national challenge.  
 
This concurs with an economic situation which makes Peru more able 
than before to address public investment urgencies. According to the 
International Monetary Fund, in 2015 Peru was already a middle income 
country with a GDP of $192.1 billion (ranking 48th of 192 countries), a 
population of 31.9 Million people (ranking 42nd of 217 countries) and a GDP 
per capita of $6,021.1 (ranking 111th of 217 countries), with a 0.34% share of 
World GDP (PPP) (World Economic Forum, 2016).  
 
 
3. Infrastructure in Peru 
In this section I address the standing of Peru on infrastructure performance 
according to the widely used indicators, the infrastructure gap the country is still 
experiencing and the magnitude of the challenge that its closure entails. Also, the 
specific efforts that the recent Peruvian administrations made since the 1990s to 
these days to design and implement policies aimed at contributing more resources to 
this objective. 
  
According to the World Economic Forum (WEF), Peru has recently shown 
growing economic features, but the infrastructure gap between its urban and rural 
areas, and its overall shortage or lack of infrastructure including roads (paved or 
even rustic), trains, airports and ports, as well as the gap on social infrastructure for 
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services such as education, justice and security and health, need to be closed soon 
in order to sustain the current and further development of the country (WEF, 2016). 
 
According to the WEF Global Competitive Report 2016-2017, Peru ranked 
89th among 138 countries in infrastructure performance. Regarding the quality of it, 
quality of overall infrastructure (115th), quality of roads (110th), quality of railroads 
(91th), Peru is still poorly ranked and -despite its growth during the last 22 years- it 
still shows the urgent need for greater investment improvement and performance 
improvement in this field. After 2013, Peru was still behind the Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) region median performance in terms of available roads (density) 
and pavement of those, sanitation, water and access and price of electricity. 
Similarly, it remained behind neighbor countries like Colombia and Ecuador in terms 
of basic services like available roads (density), sanitation, water and access to 
electricity.  
 
Table 1. Access to infrastructure in Peru and countries in Latin America 
Indicators Peru Colombia Ecuador LAC Region 
Road Density (Km/100Km2) 6 10 15 17 
% of paved roads  18 14 15 23 
Quality of port infrastructure (index) 3.3 3.5 2.9 3.2 
Quality of airport infrastructure (index) 4.5 4.1 4.4 4.2 
Access to improved sanitation (% of population) 63 86 89 77 
Access to improved water (% of population) 83 93 94 90 
Access to electricity (% of population)  73 81 80 78 
Price of electricity for residential users (US$/Kw) 11.37 7.7 13.03 8.77 
Source: Peru Revamps its Public Investment System (2013). Jonas et al.  
Document and data are retrievable at: https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21051  
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The Peruvian government has actively adopted Private Public Partnership (PPP) 
schemes to develop needed infrastructure since the mid 1990s and the number of 
projects carried out under some PPP in Peru is continuously increasing. In the 
country’s official development framework for its 200th anniversary (Plan 
Bicentenario: Ceplan, 2011), regional development and infrastructure is considered 
one of the 6 main issues towards 2021. Subsequently, and across different 
administrations –though with different level of ambition- public decisions were made 
to allocate massive resources before that year. 
 
 
3.1. The Peruvian Infrastructure Funding Gap 
According to the Peruvian Private Association for the Promotion of 
Infrastructure, AFIN2, the total long run Peruvian infrastructure funding gap 
(projected for 2016-2025) amounts to US$ 159,549,0003, which is projected to be 
8.27% of the Peruvian GDP for 20254. 
 
This projection breaks down in total gaps in infrastructure for i) water systems 
of $12,252 Million, ii) telecommunications of $27,036 Million, iii) transportation 
(including roads, railroads and trains, ports and airports) of $57,499 Million, iv) 
energy of $30,775 Million, v) health, of $18,944 Million, vi) education, of $4,568 
Million and vii) hydraulics (industry oriented) of $8,477 Million, following data 
contained in table 2. 
 
 
                                                
2 Data is retrievable at http://afin.org.pe/publicaciones/estudios (Website in Spanish) 
3 In 2015 US dollars. 
4 This estimate, also by AFIN (see footnote 2). 
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Table 2 
Medium and Long Term Infrastructure Gap (In 2015 Millions of $ US Dollars) 
 
Sector 
 
Medium Term Gap 
(2016-2021) 
 
 
Gap  
(2021-2025) 
 
Long Term Gap  
(2016-2025) 
Water and Sewage 6970 5282 57499 
Transportation 21253 36246 30775 
Telecommunications 12603 14432 27036 
Hydraulics 4537 3940 18944 
Health 9472 9472 12252 
Energy 11388 19387 8477 
Education 2592 1976 4568 
Total  68815 90735 159551 
Source: Peruvian Association for the Promotion of Infrastructure (AFIN) Studies. 
 
 
 
The cost of closing of this gap in the long run, approximately 8.27% of the 
projected Peruvian GDP for 2025 is certainly one that, given the usual financial 
position and obligations of the Peruvian Government, could not possibly be assumed 
by the Peruvian treasury alone. This hurdle becomes even more significant when 
recalling that the Peruvian government tax revenue has been decreasing in the last 
three years (2015 to 2016)5 according to SUNAT, the Peruvian Tax Collection 
Superintendence, and Government spending remains stable.  
 
Therefore an urgency exists for attracting private investment to align it with 
public objectives in this field. That is not only a struggle of Peruvian public officers 
but of many of their peers in most developing countries of the world.  
 
 
 
 
3.2 Peruvian PPP and Private Participation in Public Works: A timeline 
                                                
5 Official historic data on Peru national tax revenue is available at: 
http://www.sunat.gob.pe/estadisticasestudios/busqueda_ingresos.html  
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Back in 1991, the Peruvian government announced a comprehensive 
privatization plan for government assets and public owned companies, in order to 
optimize government expenditure and to attract private investment. The majority of 
those public assets had been expropriated by military dictatorships during the 
decade of 1970, leading to massive and longstanding operating losses borne by the 
taxpayer. 
 
During that same decade, the Peruvian government changed its approach to 
new infrastructure projects using Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and other 
forms of concession contracts rather than sticking to the conventional 
privatization (a full privatization contract, used in the case of energy 
distribution, telecommunications, oil and mining companies and many of their 
units).  
 
In 1996, Laws allowing for those concessions were enacted and contracts in 
public infrastructure under those were allowed. Peru underwent a massive 
privatization and concession process during the decade which tangibly increased 
connectivity and the access of its citizens to basic services like electricity and 
telecommunication services with an ever increasing portion of the territory covered, 
which in turn increased labor productivity (Webb, 2013).  
 
In 2006 the Peruvian government introduced a new policy to minimize risks on 
PPP projects. The government was now able to issue a certification of payment for 
the initial investment made in infrastructure works (Certificados de Reconocimiento 
de Derechos del Pago Anual por Obras, CRPAO) to private partners, following the 
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infrastructure building progress. Private companies could issue project bonds using 
that certificate as a collateral for their financial process. 
 
This certification system was once again modified by a new system named 
RPICAO (Remuneración por Inversiones según Certificado de Avance de Obra), 
following IMF advice suggesting those certificates needed to be registered as 
national debt. Also, a minimum revenue guarantee after completion of construction 
(Pagos Anuales por Mantenimiento y Operacion, PAMO) was adopted in Design Bid 
Finance Operate and Maintain (DBFOM) contracts. 
  
Peru also adopted the “Co-Finance Private Initiative” to broaden the scope of 
private participation in this area. In this contract type, a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV)6 is created to have a public entity and private contractors share risk on one or 
more components of infrastructure delivery. 
 
In 2008 Law 29230 was enacted in 2008 to promote private sector 
participation in public infrastructure projects through income tax and royalty 
deduction, or Works for Taxes. Given the significance of the adjustments for 
purposes of the analysis I will carry out on part II of this work, a detail on the legal 
evolution of this new scheme is shown in the following table and section. 
 
 
 
                                                
6 A Special Purpose Vehicle is a legal entity, exclusively incorporated to carry out the tasks set under a contract, 
and typically intended to manage the operation of the public assets held under some public private partnership 
form, complying with the duties that such entity must comply pursuant to applicable law and the contract 
governing it. 
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Table 3. Legal Evolution of the Peruvian Works for Taxes System 
Year Instrument 
2008 Law 29230, Works for Taxes Law. Promotes Regional and Local Public 
Investment with Private Participation in Health, Education, Tourism, Agriculture, 
Irrigation, etc. Certificates for Tax credits (CIPRL) are non-tradable. 
2009 Urgency Decree (Executive Order) 081-2009, defines General Comptroller 
participation in audits of requesting governments and supervision of contracts.  
2012 Supreme Decree 133-2012-EF: Approves implementing regulation for Law 29230 
including reimbursement of feasibility studies for works and procedures’ details. 
Certificates for Tax credits (CIPRL) are non-tradable. 
2013 Law 30138: Amends Law 29230 on Works for Taxes (public budget provisions) 
2013 Law 30056: Amends Law 29230 on Works for Taxes 
Certificates for Tax credits (CIPRL) can now be traded. 
Maintenance of Works and Facilities is included in the System. 
2014 Supreme Decree 005-2014-EF: Approves new implementing regulation for Law 
29230, as amended.  
Certificates for Tax credits (CIPRL) are negotiable except when the company 
paying for the work is also the constructor. Certificates are emitted 
electronically. No interest is paid on them. 
2014 Law 30264, Includes National Government Entities as participants in the System. 
2015 Supreme Decree 006-2014-EF, details National Government entities’ participation. 
2015 Supreme Decree 409-2015-EF: New implementing regulation for Law 29230 as 
amended. It broadens its scope with sectors such as Culture (historical heritage, 
sports and sanitation) and facilitates contracts proposed by potential investors.  
2016 Legislative Decree 1250  
Allows joint approval of Government entity and supervisor. 
Creates Electronic Platform for Certificate record, control and trade. 
2017 Supreme Decree 036-2017-EF More specific, all government level applicable rules.  
Source: http://www.proinversion.gob.pe/modulos/JER/PlantillaStandard.aspx?ARE=0&PFL=1&JER=8191 and El 
Peruano Official Gazette’s section on statutes and regulations. 
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4. The Works for Taxes System 
 In this section, I will address the operation of the system and its procedural 
steps for governments and private companies to use them and deliver prioritized 
infrastructure projects in urban and rural areas of Peru. I will indicate the steps that 
these actors need to follow to deliver works under the system, the benefits that the 
Government of Peru states the system features and, following the structure and 
procedures required in the system, I identify elements of institutional design on which 
the success of the system rests. 
 
Law No. 29230, called "Works for Taxes Law" (“Ley de Obras por Impuestos”) 
(Hereinafter “the Law”), as amended (see Table 3), is a regulation issued by the 
Peruvian government in 2008, which seeks to accelerate the implementation of 
priority public infrastructure projects across the country.  
  
The Law allows a private company, individually or working in a consortium, to 
finance and implement public projects prioritized by all levels of Government7 in 
Peru, and later recover the total amount of its investment in the form of a tax credit to 
be used to pay against due Corporate Income Tax (classified as “3rd category” 
income tax by SUNAT, the Peru tax administration agency). This credit is 
acknowledged through a Certificate of Recognition of the Work (Hereinafter, 
“CIPRL”), that can be discounted in financial institutions and the value of which is 
adjusted for inflation should the infrastructure project take longer than a year to 
complete.  
                                                
7 The Peruvian public administration is organized in Central (Presidential and Cabinet Authority), Regional (25 
major areas authorities subject to central legislation, but exercising delegated authorities in limited areas) and 
Local Governments (called Municipalities, in charge of district level neighborhood and rural services). 
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Since 2008, when the Law was enacted, a series of works for taxes projects 
were prioritized by different levels of Government in Peru, and implemented to build 
basic public infrastructure such as water and sewage networks, roads, small 
healthcare centers, among others.  
 
The system was designed in Peru as a new model of public private 
partnership where both parties benefit and in which there are additional advantages 
for companies based in Peru, and operating in certain regions of this country where 
infrastructure is underprovided, which deserve our attention on their dynamics. 
Under the system, all levels of government and public universities in Peru could 
prioritize, within their investment budget, projects deemed important for their 
community and requiring delivery. On their end, private companies based in Peru 
can directly finance one or more of those projects (from which their workers or 
adjacent communities could benefit), receiving a certificate for the value of the works 
paid, to use as tax credit against the following year income tax return.  
  
Through the Works for Taxes system, and within the thresholds (Constraints) 
set in the regulation of the system, all of Peru's Government levels are able to secure 
and forward financial resources required for different infrastructure projects they 
have already prioritized (or even received proposals for, as unsolicited projects), 
from private companies of any origin, based and paying income tax in Peru, which 
will bid for the work selected and pay for it should they win the bid. The work of the 
contractors hired by the winning company needs to be supervised by an independent 
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contractor, who is in charge of issuing a technical approval of the work once it is 
concluded satisfactorily.  
On the other side of this scheme, private partners’ benefits may include –
among others- nationally spread brand value to the company, as these works 
make people in the place associate the company's image to longstanding projects 
with a deep and meaningful positive social impact.  
 
Companies can have a tangible return on their investment and the Peruvian 
society benefits as well, given that the prioritized or proposed project could have 
substantial spillovers over the public services rendered to their workers and their 
communities, and as projects are implemented and operating in less time than they 
would if they were carried out as fully public investment projects or PIP (“Proyecto de 
Inversión Pública”), the traditional delivery system of infrastructure in Peru. 
 
The procedure followed under the Works for Taxes mechanism is the following: 
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4.1 Public Services Covered 
Pursuant to the Law, all kinds of public infrastructure projects are viable under the 
system. The Peruvian Central Government -and Regional and Local governments as 
well-, however, usually prioritize projects with strong local or regional impact, mostly 
in the following categories: 
 
Health: Construction and/or improvement of the response capacity of hospitals, 
health centers, health facilities, municipal or regional clinics and/or maternal and 
child units. Per the project size, building one or more stages may be considered. 
 
Education: Educational infrastructure projects such as schools, classrooms, 
libraries and laboratories. These projects may include the operation equipment of the 
facility (e.g., computers in an IT learning space, training equipment in a gym, etc.). 
 
Water and sanitation: Building, rehabilitation, improvement and expansion of 
drinking water and sewage systems and wastewater treatment plants. These may 
have any dimension and should be designed according to served population’s sizes 
and growth estimates. 
 
Local Road Infrastructure: Road infrastructure works involving the construction, 
rehabilitation or paving of roads and sidewalks, road interchanges, pedestrian 
bridges, among others. 
 
Regional transport infrastructure: This refers to paved roads, bridges, roads 
and/or dirt roads and feeder roads (e.g. new unpaved roads allowing people from a 
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distant community connect on vehicles with a paved road and reduce travel and 
goods transportation times). These projects could connect two or more districts or 
two or more regions of the country. Usually their prioritization is overseen by the 
National Government, through the Peruvian Ministry of Transports and 
Communications (MTC).  
 
Irrigation: Small irrigation projects such as regulating ponds, irrigation canals, and 
intakes, among other water system stages. Projects may include modern irrigation 
equipment and their maintenance.  
 
Public sanitation: Small and medium solid waste management integrated projects, 
including recycling and treatment plants and/or landfills. 
 
Energy and Telecommunications: Building, rehabilitation and equipping of small 
power systems and rural electrification projects. Also, telecommunication systems 
(fixed, mobile and internet) in small or rural towns. 
Tourism: Services infrastructure adding value to a selected tourism resource, 
enabling the transformation of that tourist resource not yet taken advantage of, into 
an active and more valuable tourist attraction. These works may include providing 
access services, interpretation, guidance, information to visitors, among others. 
 
Recreation and others: Civic centers, theme parks, recreational and sports courts 
and centers, Institutional buildings, small bus terminals, theaters, food markets and 
wholesale markets (regularly managed by municipalities at the provincial or district 
level in Peru). 
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4.2 Steps of the System  
 
4.2.1. Procedure to be followed by the Private Partner 
As the first step, and within the allocated budget for the system, the central, regional 
or local government or a public university should determine, in an executive, regional 
or municipal council meeting or university council meeting (as applicable), a list of 
priority projects to be executed through the Works for Taxes mechanism. These 
projects need to fit within the definition of Public Investment Project under the Peruvian 
Ministry of Economy and Finance regulations. The decision will be sent to 
PROINVERSION (The Peru National Investment Promotion Agency) and published 
by it and the soliciting agency or entity. 
  
A private company will finance the project it is interested in (Funding originates in the 
very tax debt of companies as they pay regular income tax in Peru every March). The 
project i) may be selected from the priority list issued by the central or some regional 
or local government or a public university, or ii) could be created by the company and 
submitted to the Government entity or public university in the area, to be considered 
and included in its priority list. The latter is a way in which the company creates a 
private initiative (unsolicited) that must be in line with a priority identified by the central, 
local, regional or university authorities. Naturally, if the company promotes it, we shall 
understand it aligns and serves both the company and the public interest. 
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Since July 2013, Peruvian Law allows regional and local governments and public 
universities to solicit the maintenance of infrastructure, and not only the construction 
or rehabilitation of infrastructure, under this mechanism. 
  
Therefore, under the Law, in a regular project flow under the Peru Works for Taxes 
mechanism: 
  
i)              A private company chooses a project from the priority list established by a 
regional, municipal or university council or proposes a specific project of 
interest to these authorities, which conducts a selection process to find the 
private company that will finance and/or execute the works. 
ii)              At the end of this process, a contract for the project investment stage will be 
signed. Once the regional or local government, or the public university, 
receives the work, it will request the Peru Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(MEF) -in charge of treasury and taxes as well as economy-, to issue a 
Regional and Local Public Investment Certificate (CIPRL). 
  
iii)              A CIPRL is the formal document issued by MEF to the private company that 
financed a project with its income tax. It is used to the order of the private 
company in the following tax year, and is valid for the next ten years, to 
deduct an amount equal to the funds provided for the works from its income 
tax to be paid to SUNAT, or such amount adjusted for inflation, should the 
project take more than a year to be completed. 
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iv)           After the completion of works and within the following twenty working days, 
the private partner will receive the certificate of compliance with quality 
standards and the acknowledgement of satisfactory reception of the 
infrastructure project by the requesting entity (either a government or a 
public university). 
  
v)         Within a period of no more than three working days, the regional or local 
government or the public university will apply with the General Office of Debt 
and Treasury (DGETP) of MEF for a CIPRL, incorporating in such 
application the legal name and taxpayer number (RUC) of the company, the 
value of the works in Peruvian Currency (Nuevos Soles) and a copy of the 
document supporting the registration of the budgetary and financial 
allocation in the Information System for the Public Sector Financial 
Administration (SIAF-SP). 
  
vi)           Should the regional or local government or public university not apply for a 
CIPRL of works already completed, the private company may request 
DGETP to issue a CIPRL that demonstrates its compliance of all the project 
requirements. Simultaneously, the company should inform the regional or 
local government or public university accordingly, requesting them to 
register the budgetary and financial allocation in the SIAF-SP. 
  
vii)          A CIPRL may also be issued every quarter, if the project has an execution 
term of more than six months. If applicable, the soliciting public entity should 
inform the private partner at the beginning of the process that it may apply 
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for the issue of CIPRLs every quarter. For this purpose, the Committee 
deciding on the work will include in the terms for the selection process, that 
this schedule will be the reference for the issuance of one or more quarterly 
CIPRL. 
  
viii)           Either way, the procedure to obtain a quarterly CIPRL begins with the 
request from a private company to the public partner´s works management 
office (or similar entity), accompanied by the certificate and valuation of the 
progress of the works issued by the company supervising the work (To 
incentivize quality and accountability, under law, each Works for Taxes 
project should include an independent contractor hired by the Government 
entity, which supervises the work of the contractor directly carrying out each 
project8, assess the quality of the work and giving a final technical conformity 
at the time or completion if it finds it satisfactory, or technically object the 
work if it does not). The public entity works management office will approve 
the amount for this progress or work in a formal decision (a “resolution”), 
and will arrange with DGETP the issuance of a CIPRL for the private partner 
within no more than three working days.  
  
Any Peruvian or foreign legal person, including those that have entered stability 
contracts9  with Peru, may participate in a Works for Taxes selection process, provided 
                                                
8 Article 9 of Peruvian Law 29230 on Works for Taxes establishes that an independent private 
company shall be hired by the requiring Government entity to supervise the work carried out by the 
contractor on site. The Supervisor is in charge of giving the works the final technical approval. 
9 Pursuant to Peruvian Law, Stability Agreements are investment promotion contracts signed by the 
Peruvian Government and foreign or national investors, to set guarantees for the investor or company 
receiving an investment. They typically include rights to non-discriminatory treatment, 10 year stable 
income tax (except for concessions, in which stability may last as long as the concession itself), free 
exchange and transfer of currency,   profits, and royalties. Local companies receiving investment may 
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that they comply with the legal, technical and financial requirements established in the 
terms of the selection process, and that it pays taxes in Peru.  
 
Typically, a company will, aside from other smaller charges, pay Sales Tax and 
Corporate Income Tax when operating in Peru, aside from other smaller, labor, 
property use and municipal permit related contributions. 
  
Two or more companies may participate in the Works for Taxes system jointly, 
as a consortium, without the need for creating a new legal entity (The consortium 
would be the special purpose vehicle they agree upon to work on the project). In this 
case, the existence of a formal contract creating a consortium (Vehicle) must be 
demonstrated (regularly with a private contract between the consortium members). 
  
Any company presenting legal impediments to become a bidder and/or a 
contractor under Peruvian Public Procurement Law will not be allowed to participate 
in the selection process.  
 
  
                                                
stabilize income tax regime and labor contract forms used at the moment of signature. Minimum 
investment to apply is $10 Million US dollars for mining and energy and $5 Million dollars for other 
sectors. Full official detail on contracts, formats and legal reference is available at: 
https://www.investinperu.pe/modulos/JER/PlantillaStandard.aspx?are=1&prf=0&jer=5933&sec=17  
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4.2.2 Benefits of the System 
According to the Agency promoting the System and leading these processes, the 
Works for Taxes System benefits Peruvian regional and local governments, public 
universities (labeled altogether as “public entities”), private companies and society, 
essentially as indicated in Table 4.   
 
Table 4. 
Financial and Social Benefits of the Works for Taxes System 
 
 
For Public Entities 
 
For Companies 
 
For the Society 
Increased local economic 
dynamism or performance. 
Direct and Efficient use of 
Income Tax 
Wider Public Service coverage and 
higher service quality 
Faster implementation of high 
social impact works 
Full Recovery of 
Investment 
Creation of direct and indirect jobs 
in the community, either through 
construction or during subsequent 
operation and maintenance works. 
Simplification of Procedures and 
freeing up of technical resources 
Association of the Image 
with social impact works. 
Promotion of the Undertaking of 
quality public works, guaranteed by 
the financing company. 
Provision of Financial advances, 
deducted the year following 
completion of works. 
Improved relations with 
their stakeholders. 
Contribution to the development of 
a taxpayer culture and the 
implementation of corporate social 
responsibility plans  
Increased current investment 
budget 
Faster delivery of works 
that could enhance both 
local and the company’s 
competitiveness. 
 
Source: Peru Agency for the Promotion of Investment (Proinversion) 
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5. Notes on elements in which the systems rests  
 After laying out the announced benefits of the system I shall now point out to 
some elements of the system on which its success -understood as it becoming a 
relevant source of financial resources to help close the Peruvian infrastructure gap- 
actually depends. It is a common understanding that no public policy system would 
be successful without proper management or oversight of specialized officers in 
charge, bearing in their work all required elements to make it productive and attain 
the outcome expected in a sound, predictable and transparent fashion.  
 
5.1 The participants: Technical capacity and political will  
 
Three essential public actors intervene in the process, namely i) the 
Government or public University requesting the project (hereinafter regarded as The 
“Government Entity”), ii) Proinversion –the Peruvian Private Investment Promotion 
Agency- and iii) the Ministry of Economy of Finance of Peru –in charge of issuing the 
tax credit certificates-. On the other hand, three essential private actors also 
participate, iv) the Private Company, v) the Contractor hired by the private company 
to carry out the chosen work and vi) the Private Supervisor, hired by the Government 
entity, to ensure the quality of the work delivered.   
 
Given the relative legal and financial complexity required from the projects 
that the Government entity should file before Proinversion to be included in the 
yearly official list of projects responding to actual or projected demand10 and 
                                                
10 Projects for which there is current demand but for which a reasonable estimate of demand can be 
made, may be considered viable and carried out under the system. For example, a new, shorter road 
uniting several communities with a city, which will replace a two times longer decaying dirt road 
currently in use.  
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declared as financially viable within the budget allocated for the system by the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru, their success rests on two general factors. 
The first and quite evident factor is the compliance of all legal and procedural 
requirements for carrying our projects under the system. This, because 
noncompliance would entail legal consequences including, in some cases, the 
termination of contracts and the complete suspension of the project.   
 
The second factor, largely more complex, lies in the i) the technical 
capacities and ii) the willingness to work on these projects (transparently and sharing 
objectives) of authorities and professionals in Government entities, the Peruvian 
Ministry of Economy (authorizing budgets and operations and issuing tax credit 
certificates) Proinversion (the Peruvian investment promotion agency conducting or 
assisting the process requested by a Government entity) and the corresponding 
government sectors (those to which the proposed infrastructure piece is planned to 
contribute to).  
 
It must be noted that though the technical capacity and willingness of the 
private companies participating in the system, and those of the financial system 
entities discounting the tax credits certificates are likely high, given that they 
specialize in business and financial work, neither of them drives the procedures. 
They are just the ones soliciting them and discounting the tax credit certificates only 
issued after works are completed and approved both by the Government entity and 
the private supervisor or the works.   
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Successful projects will likely require a conjunction of those two essential 
elements. Given the subjective nature of the second element –a strong political will 
to carry out the procedure and works in a lawful-, a greater level of uncertainty and 
must be attributed to it. The conditions influencing this factor are beyond the scope 
of this work, but are certainly a topic for further qualitative analysis and research 
regarding this infrastructure delivery system, as well other forms of regional and local 
private public partnership. 
 
5.1.1 Downsides: Technical capacities and Interagency Coordination 
 Since technical capacities in local and public administrations and a strong 
political will to engage in procedures under this system –which may be new to many 
officers and elected officials- are sine qua non condition for the successful operation 
of the Works for Taxes system, we shall think of the scenario in which they do not 
concur or are not allowed to align with the central government general initiative for 
private public works in urgent social infrastructure.  
  
Starting from the capacities of officers at a district level, we will find that the 
challenge that a national investment promotion agency –like the Peruvian 
Proinversion- faces is immense and should entail a powerful stakeholder 
engagement side if it is to be successful. Not only should private companies be 
aware of this mechanism but the very beneficiaries that the Ministry of Economy (or 
whoever does the role of authorizing public expenditure in a work prioritized under 
this scheme) but more importantly the people. It is certainly outside the scope of my 
work to analyze how much the Peruvian people know about this system, but given 
that it is constituencies that should exercise citizenship to promote and sometimes 
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demand work on urgent services and pieces of infrastructure, the tool should be 
available to them. It is not an irrational idea to set digital mechanisms to collect the 
people’s opinion on urgent infrastructure in far regions of the country and around 
their communities. Citizen’s communication of needs regarding basic social services 
   
 A failure of one or two of these essential conditions, technical capacities and 
willing to work on a rather new system, will lead to infrastructure paralysis and 
discouraging of potential private partners in one or more regions. Systems like these 
therefore need to secure the elements on which their operations’ progress and 
success depend on.  
 
After reviewing all the legal framework of the Peruvian Work for Taxes 
system, unfortunately I have not found institutional means for either Proinversion or 
the Ministry of Economy to go on the ground, there where seems to be a deficit on 
one or more of these essential elements. A key feature in this system –as it is 
announced- is the transference of knowledge from financial experts and highly 
trained government officials to less trained local and regional government officials 
that will progressively participate in these projects. The only way to secure this 
transfer is a process of joint work between officials that this system does not appear 
to provide for in its enabling regulations. Whether this is done at a statutory of 
regulatory level, it is needed to secure key elements of the system and, more 
importantly, a democratization of the real drive for transparent prioritization of works. 
And that is citizens informed about their resources, tools at hand, and conscious of 
their urgent needs in terms of basic social services infrastructure. 
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5.2. Legal Burdens and improvement 
 
As shown in Table 3 (Legal Evolution of the Peruvian Works for Taxes 
System), several legal adjustments were made to the system during its first decade 
of operation. Generally, the scope of works that could be covered through the 
system was constantly expanded, up to the point where it is now possible for 
participating companies to pay for the provision of public infrastructure maintenance 
or equipment through the system.   
 
Through these adjustments to the system, timeframes in required procedures 
were generally shortened and repetitive steps eliminated to incentivize its use by 
more companies. A critical adjustment, however, was the making of the certificate for 
tax credit (CIPRL or CIPGN depending on the level of Government requesting 
works) a negotiable instrument in 2013, essentially allowing the companies 
participating in the system to discount it in banks to obtain liquidity if needed before 
the moment of paying income tax (in Peru, regularly every March).  
The possibility of trading the certificate is however still banned to the company 
participating if it is itself the contractor carrying out the specific work. The rationale 
behind this prohibition is that, under the existing legal framework, the contractor may 
not commit with the Government entity to contract someone to carry out some work, 
and at the same time be itself the company hired for that specific work. This 
prohibition is made in the understanding that a company (if it is one dedicated to 
construction, civil engineering, etc.) may not hire and oversee itself. But it is notable 
in the system as it is now, that even when the soliciting private company is the one 
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directly carrying out the work, it will necessarily be supervised by a third party, hired 
by the Government entity, and which is an independent contractor solely dedicated 
to guaranteeing the quality of the infrastructure delivery. I will address the effects of 
the tradability of these certificates and the potential effects of this specific formal 
prohibition for civil contractors in Part II of this work.   
  
5.3 Further amendments: an ongoing process  
In an evolving process of policy improvement, and though not changing the 
essence of the system, the Peruvian administration has consistently considered 
adjustments to the rules governing it. This, with a view to simplifying, and by doing 
so, expanding its use. Amendments detailed in Table 3 were made to introduce 
changes at the procedural level of the mechanism, seek simplicity, facilitate 
administrative decisions, and widen the scope of the system, which is now open 
even to unsolicited projects for infrastructure pieces in new fields of social 
infrastructure, not explicitly referred in regulations (e.g. an cultural center with a small 
business incubator facility, prioritized by a community that produces fine art crafts 
and intends to generate an export cluster).  
As it is stated in the motivation for each of these statutes and executive 
regulations, the aim of the Peruvian government has always been expanding the use 
and therefore the availability of financial resources through this type of private 
investment in public services infrastructure, with a particular focus on districts that 
are distant from major Peruvian cities.  
 
Additionally, the Peruvian Investment Promotion Agency (Proinversion) 
creation Act was amended to improve its role and attain efficiencies in the 
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procedures it conducts, including improving the quality and timeliness of process 
under its responsibility, such as those of Works for Taxes, where it is allowed to 
either assist the Government entity requesting the work or carry out the whole 
process for works by itself, if required by such Government entity. Changes include 
some referred to a) making it less personally burdensome for public officers in 
charge of PPP and works for taxes procedures to decide on them, b) alleviating 
unnecessary oversight controls and duties, c) allowing the agency to contract 
specialized services for improving management quality, and d) securing legal and 
insurance coverage for its officials and assets, anticipating any complaint or 
grievance process arising from contested bidding processes11.  
 
 
 
  
                                                
11 Under the rules governing the Works for Taxes system, there is a dispute settlement mechanism 
intended to solve any complaint or dispute arising from the bidding process for each work. Adjustment 
to these rules have provided for the legal defense of officers in charge of bidding processes if they are 
subject to any judicial procedure related to these disputes. This is intended to cover them from 
frivolous or not sustained suits or legal charges.    
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Part II   
1. Performance of the Works for Taxes System: The First Decade  
 
 In Part II of this work my objective is to address the question of whether the 
Works for Taxes system has helped close the Peruvian infrastructure gap. For this 
purpose, I analyzed a data set containing the whole detail on all projects carried out in 
Peru under the Works for Taxes system since its creation in 2008 until December 
2017.  
 Using an observational longitudinal approach, I analyzed this data set 
identifying the geographical reach of the system works, the areas of public service 
covered by those, the number and type of companies participating in it, and the 
growth of investment and beneficiaries in the system, all at a department level, 
during the period under study (2008-2017). This allowed me to evaluate the 
performance of the system in the task of helping Peru close the infrastructure gap it 
still faces.  
 Since the data set contains detail on all processes under the system during 
the period under study, it is representative of the population analyzed as well as 
reliable, as it originates in a formal centralized registry of these operations within the 
Peruvian Government. Therefore it allows for accurate observation of the effects of 
the system and direct interpretation of such observations.  
 
On December 2017, I traveled to Peru12 and had meetings with two high level 
officers of the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Peru (Hereinafter, “MEF”), Mr. 
                                                
12 This on site work was made possible through financial support from the Cornell University Off-Campus Opportunity Fund 
(OCOF) and the Cornell University Institute of Public and International Affairs (CIPA), which I deeply thank. 
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Camilo Carrillo, Peru General Director for Private Investment Promotion Policy, and 
Mr. Juan Pablo Miranda Leo, MEF main officer in charge of the promotion and follow 
up on the use of the system by Peruvian Government entities and their private 
counterparts.  After thorough conversations on the details included in the successive 
legal adjustments made to original version of the system (enacted by Peruvian in 
Law 29230, of May 2008), and the stakeholder engagement process that those 
adjustments required, I obtained a very detailed time series data set showing the full 
performance of the system –every work done in Peru- since its enactment date until 
December 5th, 2017.  
 
The data set on which I base my analysis indicates, among others, the 
department, province and district of Peru where works were done, the percentage of 
completion of each work if still ongoing and the corresponding percentage of CIPRL 
(or CIPGN) certificates issued in each process. Also, the level of Government and 
entity requiring the work, the year the work was done, the legal status of each 
contract, the Government Sector with competence over each work (depending on 
the type of infrastructure built), the private company paying for the work, the number 
of direct beneficiaries estimated in the project files, the total amount paid for works 
under each contract, the dates the works started and ended and a brief description 
of each project (its specific purpose).  
Although all its contents originate in data that Proinversion –the Peruvian 
private investment promotion agency- makes available through its official website 
and access to information channels, I have uploaded this data set on my personal 
site13 (in its original Spanish version) to allow for any further analysis of the 
                                                
13 Download of this data set is available at: https://alvarodiazbedregal.wordpress.com/2018/04/24/works-for-taxes-peru-data-as-
of-12-5-17/  
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information it contains and of the analysis in this piece.  My analysis in this part is 
based on this data set, and on public statistics on general economic performance of 
Peru and its 24 departments14 I will refer.  
 
2. Findings on the application of the system 
2.1 Total Investment and distribution  
Looking at data on accumulated investment made through the system in the 
period under study, and first indicating that not all 25 departments of Peru carried out 
projects under Works for Taxes in this period, I found the following total investment, 
distribution and percentages among the 25 departments of Peru, including –as a 
separate unit- Lima City and the Port of Callao15: 
Table 5 
Total Investment through Works for Taxes in Peru (by department, 2008-2017) 
 
                                                
14 Under its Political Constitution, Peru is a unitary democracy, with a National Government, 25 regional 
governments (governors), 24 department authorities (mayors), 196 provincial authorities 
(mayor/council) within departments, and 1874 district authorities (mayor/council) within provinces. 
Therefore, only at subnational levels of government, 2119 different authorities and budgets could use 
available resources for infrastructure projects carried out under the system. 
15 For purposes of this distribution and analysis, I consider Lima City and the Port of Callao (Peru’s 
main port and constitutional province) as departments, given their high demographic relevance. 
44 
 
 
 
One first finding from accumulated investment data is that, during the period 
under analysis, the departments in which the system was more intensively used 
were Piura, Arequipa, Ancash, Cusco, Tacna, Ica, Moquegua and La Libertad. The 
system was less used in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Ucayali, Lima City (Lima 
Metropolitana), Callao (the Lima City adjacent port province) and Cajamarca. As of 
the date where data was recorded, the system had not been used in the Amazonas, 
Apurímac, Madre de Dios, San Martín and Tumbes departments.  
 
In terms of percentage of total investment made through the system during 
this period, and taking the Three Region Division referred in Part I (Coast, Andes 
and Rainforest), where departments are considered located in the region where their 
corresponding capital city is, the following is the distribution between regions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region
Total Investment
(S/.)
Total Investment
(US$ )
Percentage of Total 
Ancash 413,677,589 127,875,607.26                                               11.8
Arequipa 503,747,607 155,717,961.95                                               14.3
Ayacucho 882,128 272,682.47                                                      0.0
Cajamarca 72,156,931 22,305,079.05                                                 2.1
Callao 44,563,569 13,775,446.50                                                 1.3
Cusco 303,376,487 93,779,439.69                                                 8.6
Huancavelica 19,127,189 5,912,577.60                                                   0.5
Huanuco 67,177,161 20,765,737.43                                                 1.9
Ica 214,627,673 66,345,494.05                                                 6.1
Junín 77,809,797 24,052,487.51                                                 2.2
La Libertad 201,466,166 62,277,022.01                                                 5.7
Lambayeque 61,502,943 19,011,728.90                                                 1.7
Lima 112,947,003 34,914,065.84                                                 3.2
Lima Metropolitana 8,380,862 2,590,683.86                                                   0.2
Loreto 114,735,749 35,467,001.18                                                 3.3
Moquegua 204,689,561 63,273,434.57                                                 5.8
Pasco 149,845,802 46,320,186.09                                                 4.3
Piura 542,365,465 167,655,476.11                                               15.4
Puno 117,951,902 36,461,175.19                                                 3.4
Tacna 262,056,321 81,006,590.73                                                 7.5
Ucayali 23,347,194 7,217,061.40                                                   0.7
TOTAL 3,516,435,099 1,086,996,939.40                                            100.0
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Table 6 
Regional Distribution of Peru investment through  
Works for Taxes  
     
In a country with challenging geography, including a high mountain region (the 
Andes), going almost along all its vertical axis, and with a still poorly connected 
Amazon rainforest region, it is apparent that the first factor contributing to the 
difference in amounts invested between the coast and the rainforest regions, is the 
cost of works itself, determined mostly by distance from the main cities where 
supplies are sourced, height and ease of access.  
 
Yet if we reflect about the 45% of investments made either on locations within 
the mountains or rainforest region, mostly far from the main cities of Peru, it is clear 
that the system has indeed delivered works outside the main production sites 
of the country, and far from Peru’s biggest cities (Lima, Arequipa and Trujillo –
capital of La Libertad department-) where the highest income brackets people live. 
Studies have shown that expenditure and growth among regions of Peru is affected 
mostly by an uneven provision of public infrastructure rather than by geography itself 
(Escobal et. al., 2005). A tangible evidence of this is that the second most important 
city of Peru in terms of growth, Arequipa, is located within the southern Andes 
Mountains of Peru, at 7,661 feet above sea level and holds near 1 million residents. 
55%
39%
6%
Total Investment - Works for Taxes (2008-
2017)
Coast Andes Rainforest
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It is, however, well connected to the other cities and the coast through paved roads 
and well served by basic infrastructure. 
Moreover, confronting official population estimates for 2015 (right after the 
peak of works for taxes investment), and the overall use of the system by 
department in the period under study, we find no significant pattern. Departments 
with high and low population and departments located in any of the three main 
physical regions of Peru, have indeed requested works under the system 
consistently over the first ten years of the tool.  
 
  
Total Population 
2015 
% of 
Population Region Use of System 
LIMA & CALLAO 10,848,566 34.8 coast medium 
LA LIBERTAD 1,859,640 6.0 coast high 
PIURA 1,844,129 5.9 coast high 
CAJAMARCA 1,529,755 4.9 mountains medium 
PUNO 1,415,608 4.5 mountains medium 
JUNÍN 1,350,783 4.3 mountains medium 
CUSCO 1,316,729 4.2 mountains high 
AREQUIPA 1,287,205 4.1 mountains high 
LAMBAYEQUE 1,260,650 4.0 coast medium 
ÁNCASH 1,148,634 3.7 coast high 
LORETO 1,039,372 3.3 rainforest medium 
HUÁNUCO 860,537 2.8 rainforest medium 
SAN MARTÍN 840,790 2.7 rainforest none 
ICA 787,170 2.5 coast high 
AYACUCHO 688,657 2.2 mountains medium 
UCAYALI 495,522 1.6 rainforest  medium 
HUANCAVELICA 494,963 1.6 mountains medium 
APURÍMAC 458,830 1.5 mountains none 
AMAZONAS 422,629 1.4 rainforest  none 
TACNA 341,838 1.1 coast high 
PASCO 304,158 1.0 mountains medium 
TUMBES 237,685 0.8 coast none 
MOQUEGUA 180,477 0.6 coast high 
MADRE DE DIOS 137,316 0.4 rainforest none 
TOTAL 31,151,643 100.0   
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2.2 Geographical reach  
 
The following physical map of Peru (Table 7) –showing distances and heights 
to overcome to deliver infrastructure in all three regions of Peru- evidences the 
topographic complexities and offers a graphic explanation of the high building and 
developing costs across these three regions of Peru. It is against these physical 
challenges that the Peruvian administration and the private companies participating 
in the system have worked in the past 10 years, with surprising results.  
 
 
Table 7 
A physical map and topography of Peru 
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2.3 Coverage of the system  
One additional feature flowing from the dataset is that not all departments of 
Peru have been covered by the system as of 2017. But already 20 of the 25 
departments of Peru have benefitted from works through it. Given the high costs of 
building in the Andes and Rainforest region, it is an impressive figure that the area of 
intervention reached by the system as of December 2017, in terms of departments 
covered, amounts to 98.47% of the total area of Peru (1,284,803,621.06 of 
1,285,000,000.00 square kilometers). In terms of the number of districts 
(subdivisions) covered per department, the Coastal departments of Ancash, La 
Libertad, Lima and Piura, and the mountain departments of Arequipa, Cusco, Pasco 
feature the highest figures.  
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Map of coverage shows departments where more Works for Taxes projects have been or are being developed and 
leaves blank the departments of Amazonas, Apurímac, Madre de Dios, San Martín and Tumbes where not projects 
were developed in the period under study. Tones range from blue to transparent, representing the highest number 
(Ancash, with 40 projects) to pale blue (Huánuco, Ayacucho and Lambayeque, with 1 project each). 
 
The highest altitude reached by the works done through the system was the 
at the mining district of Tinyahuarco, located in the department of Pasco, at 
impressive 4,275 meters above sea level, more than 63% of the maximum altitude in 
Peru, the peak of Mount Huascaran, at 6,768 meters above sea level. The projects 
in Tinyahuarco developed through Works for Taxes included the building of 
sidewalks, city roads and parks in the town, now enjoyed for families mostly 
dedicated to mining related activities.    
 
The distribution shown in data and these figures suggest that, aside from any 
endowed physical hardship in some routes and regions of Peru, posing a natural 
hardship on infrastructure reach and higher costs, there are institutional elements 
hindering the advance of the system. As I mentioned in part 4.1 of this work, the 
success of these system lies essentially on two institutional elements (namely legal 
compliance of standards, and technical capacity and political will among participating 
institutions). In the case of 5 departments of Peru, we shall consider the possibility 
that either a misalignment of interests and capacities was present during all the 
period under study or, in the worst case scenario, there was a political will not to use 
the system even though all departments and districts can and have available 
resources to do it.  
A clear signal of this likely public administration failure, is the fact that the 
highly accessible department of Lambayeque (see Map of Coverage), which i) is 
connected by roads and ports with all major cities of Peru, ii) is host to major 
taxpayers already participating in the system on other departments and iii) holds a 
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population of more than 1.26 Million people that undoubtedly requires public services 
infrastructures, showed only 1 project in 10 years of operation of this system.  
 
2.4 Areas of Public Service Covered 
The following is the distribution of areas of public services covered by the Works for 
taxes projects and the investment made on each area through these during the 
period under study. 
 
Table 8  
Works for Taxes – Distribution of Public Services Covered 
 
 
In line with the Peruvian Government long term policies and social urgencies 
reflected in Part I when referring to the Peruvian infrastructure medium and long term 
infrastructure gap, the areas where major investment was requested by Government 
entities requiring Works for Taxes projects were Elementary Education (16.2%), 
Education (8%) Transportation (37.2%), Health (11.1%) and Sanitation (12.5%).  
  
Transportation
Sanitation
Education
Public Safety
Justice
Culture and Sports
Defense
Water
Planning
Social Protection
Communications
Environment Quality
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0
% of Areas of Infrastructure Investment
% Areas of Infrastructure Investment
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This is consistent with the basic needs of populations in Andean valleys and 
Amazon rainforest towns where there is little or no delivery of basic public services, 
infrastructure being the first step to deliver those.  
 
Table 9 
Peru: Works for Taxes – Investment by Areas of Public Services 
 
  $ US Dollars Percentage 
Transportation 402,022,454.14 37.2 
Elementary Education 175,585,104.80 16.2 
Sanitation 135,065,970.18 12.5 
Health 120,031,908.20 11.1 
Education 86,387,932.78 8 
Internal Security 40,221,389.19 3.7 
Justice  20,086,008.91 1.9 
Culture and Sports 16,601,162.19 1.5 
Industry 12,458,771.80 1.2 
Defense 12,047,554.59 1.1 
Agriculture 10,162,109.48 0.9 
Trade 9,741,047.82 0.9 
Internal Order 8,688,863.94 0.8 
Water 8,442,602.92 0.8 
Environmental Projects 7,004,692.37 0.6 
Urban Development 4,148,061.86 0.4 
Planning 4,108,384.53 0.4 
Housing 3,192,132.19 0.3 
Social Protection 2,422,939.39 0.2 
Equipment 1,167,474.99 0.1 
Communications 1,114,776.12 0.1 
Electricity 197,986.66 0 
Environment Quality 82,871.66 0 
Total  1,080,982,200.73 100 
 
 
2.5 Participant Companies 
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The data set under study contains a detailed list of participating companies16 
which has experienced significant growth since the start of the system and its further 
legal adjustments. The sectors to which these companies belong are certainly 
important to note, as well as one characteristic of their tax status.  
 
Participant companies of the system are mainly mining companies, banks, 
manufacturing industries, telecommunication, transportation, food and fishery 
companies. The particular characteristic of all these companies is that they are 
extractive, utilities or massive sales companies, working at a national scale in Peru, 
and all of them are considered as Main Taxpayers (Principales Contribuyentes), a 
category designed by the Peruvian Tax Collection Authority, SUNAT, to group, and 
better oversee taxpayers contributing most of the national revenue in income and 
sales tax.  
 
These taxpayers are of course in a financial position that allows them to 
forward the resources needed to develop these projects around their facilities or in 
the towns and districts of Peru where they have a particular interest in generating 
better conditions for communities and building trust and brand value. And though not 
every taxpayer has a financial position allowing for this type of direct investment and 
the assumption of a still costly procedure for bidding and hiring a contractor, the 
question remains whether it would be possible, under some kind of arrangement and 
system facilitated by the tax collection agency, for smaller taxpayers to participate 
and also be empowered to directly choose the destiny of some of their income tax.  
                                                
16 The list, within the database under study is available for download at: 
https://alvarodiazbedregal.wordpress.com/2018/04/24/works-for-taxes-peru-data-as-of-12-5-17/  
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Just as major companies are, for purposes of aligning their interests with the 
public interest (Porter et. al. 2006), smaller taxpayers could also be interested in 
forwarding smaller advances of income tax and by doing so, be able to promote the 
prioritization of projects around their communities, and advancing a taxpayer culture.  
 
2.5.1 A collective Works for Taxes Fund? 
One way I propose to address this issue would be, that the tax collection 
Agency generates funding that citizens pay in advance of their future due income 
tax17, and collectively contribute to some work they also consider a priority in their 
community or surrounding areas.  
These funds could be managed by the very tax collection agency which in 
turn will have Proinversion carry out a bidding process similar to that in a standard 
Works for Taxes procedure, but itself contracting the builder, overseeing the work 
through a hired independent supervisor, and requesting the Peruvian Ministry of 
Economy the issuance of a credit certificate for each of the registered participants at 
the onset of the process. These certificates, already registered electronically since 
2014 (see Table 3, Part I) would be no different from a classical security 
representing debt. 
 
 
2.6 Benefited citizens and Investment trend 
                                                
17 Under Peruvian Law, free-lance professionals and workers receiving a paycheck from a permanent employer, 
make in advance payments of their due income tax each month. Though in smaller amounts (but probably, with 
time, in larger number of taxpayers) they too contribute in advance to the treasury and theoretically, their 
preferences could be aggregated to choose among prioritized projects when presented with them by their local 
authorities. 
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 As we can appreciate in a trend chart showing people benefitted each year 
and yearly investment through the system, there was, until 2014 a steady increase in 
both, with a decrease during 2015 mostly owed to the Peruvian political process and 
elections in early 2016, and a rise in 2016, from there was a slight decrease in 2017 
following from the data set. 
 
 
Table 10 
Works for Taxes Beneficiaries and Investment Trend 
 
 
The observation of data and trends in investment through the system and the 
number of beneficiaries of it (14,342,279 Million people in total, as of December 
201718) confirms that the adjustments made during the first years of the system in 
place (see Table 3, Part I) were probably necessary for private companies to engage 
in works under this scheme. There was little or no use of it in 2008, and starting from 
2011 its use started to become wider.  
 
                                                
18 The number of beneficiaries of each project (and therefore this total number of beneficiaries in the first ten 
years of the system) is calculated considering the population in the area, the actual and potential demand for the 
piece of infrastructure prioritized, and the sizable and attributable direct spillovers in surrounding or connected 
communities that the work may have. This number is given by the Peruvian Ministry of Finance when approving 
each proposal of works for taxes and is part of its ex ante social profitability analysis.  
0
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If we recall that tax credits certificates issued under the system were not 
negotiable at the beginning (therefore financially sinking the investment until the 
following tax paying season for the holder), It is no surprise that the number of 
companies using the mechanism started to grow only when these adjustments were 
made, progressively, starting in 2011 and really changing performance in 2013. This 
is confirmed by the fact that the companies (all of them major) participating in the 
system, went from 0 to 37 in 10 years, as indicated in the following chart, but 
increased from 14 to 31 from 2012 and 2014.  
 
 
Table 11 
Participating Companies 
 
 
We should be careful in appreciating that the forthcoming legal adjustments 
made in 2013 where known beforehand by expert users of the system, and their 
coming benefits were internalized by markets and incorporated into their cost benefit 
analysis marking a raise in investment trend since 2012. Also, we shall take into 
consideration that the number of beneficiaries’ fluctuation may not exactly mirror 
investment trends, as geographic hardships, unitary costs and populations covered, 
vary among projects.  
 
56 
 
Recalling the account of legal adjustments to the system given on Part I of  
of this work, it was in 2013, with Law 30056, which amended the original Works for 
Taxes Law, 29230, making the tax credits certificates negotiable, that the investment 
through the system and the number of companies participating in the system had a 
dramatic increase to levels that, with the exception of the election year gap of late 
2015 to early 2016, are now expected to stay.  
 
The possibility of trading tax credit certificates was therefore a critical 
step in the legal adjustment of the system, which since 2013 permitted a massive 
increase in infrastructure investment. One additional issue that deserves attention is 
the prohibition for the contractor itself to be a participant company. I see no reason 
why, under an adjusted contract form, a contractor could invest in a Works for Taxes 
project, be hired by Proinversion (ultimately, the general assistant for all regional and 
local governments on these processes, should they choose to), do it itself, and 
receive the certificate to use it as a collateral in financial institutions to fund the work 
itself.  As long as the contractor enters into a well-structured contract and has the 
supervision of an independent peer company, there is no functional reason why this 
prohibition should still be in place. When redesigning the system, a different 
procedure and contract (and not a prohibition) could be defined for contractors and 
engineering companies willing to be themselves the investors in projects under 
Works for Taxes. 
 
2.7 A Price for More Expensive Works? 
Pricing solutions to the under provision problem for infrastructure in far 
regions of Peru have not yet been considered by authorities managing this system. 
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However I believe it is useful to consider a scenario in which CIPRL or CIPGN 
values (those paid for by companies) were not only adjusted by 2% yearly (probably 
less than a normal year Peruvian inflation) but were freely tradable and yielded some 
interest rate. In that setting, the higher rate of return of CIPRL and CIPGN would 
further incentivize both their trading and the evaluation and promotion of more 
projects under the system. It would also counter the negative appeal of decisions to 
carry out projects in unprecedented regions, helping the system expand its already 
remarkable reach.  
 
Under the Peruvian Constitution, public entities may not compete or 
participate in business where there private companies are. Therefore, the rate at 
which the Government could promote the alignment of public and private interests 
through these prime certificates should be lower than the market interest rate, but 
higher than the legal interest on tax credits (paid by the Peruvian Tax Collection 
Agency, SUNAT) when it refunds money paid but not due, paid in excess or which 
turned out to be return).  
 
A proposed range for structuring these higher yielding certificates (either 
CIPRL or CIPGN if at National Government level), which will be in line with Peruvian 
constitutional boundaries and yet promote higher participation of contractors and 
companies for works outside the lower cost covered areas could be: 
 
Standard Security (principal + market interest rate) > Far Region CIPRL 
(principal + noncommercial rate) > Current CIPRL yield (principal +2% 
yearly)  
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Although the law now prohibits the payment of interest to certificate holders, 
paying a premium on CIPRL certificates from Works for Taxes in uncovered regions 
would both i) incentivize works in those under provided regions, ii) promote a market 
that would expand the reach of the system and iii) introduce an incentive for 
investors to further analyze unsolicited projects in regions where higher yielding 
CIPRL will be issued if a Works for Taxes project is carried out. And those are 
objectives any developing country seeks. 
 
Amendments to the legal framework needed to create this feature would still 
be in line with the Peruvian constitution, but incentives would be realigned to 
promote a market for investments outside the initial 37 companies participating, 
through the promotion of a market for very safe (and socially valuable) financial 
assets. The desired change in supply of infrastructure funds will happen with the 
entry of new agents to this market.  
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Conclusion 
 
In the first ten years of entering into force, the works for taxes system put in 
place by Peru expanded to influence 98.47% of the Peruvian territory and benefitted 
–according to official records contained in investment programs- 14,342,279 Million 
people, which amounts to almost half of the Peruvian population (estimated for 2017 
in 31 Million).  
 
55% of the investment made through this system was done in projects in the 
coastal region of Peru, while only 6% was placed in the Amazon rainforest region of 
Peru and 39% was made in the Andes Mountains region. Data therefore confirms 
that the system has been useful to deliver basic infrastructure outside the main 
production areas of the country. 
  
A breakdown of the distribution of investments made through the system 
shows that, after 10 years of its creation, already 20 of 25 departments of Peru 
(including the Callao port as one of them) have in some way been covered by at 
least one projects carried out under Works for Taxes. This is not however, a clear 
sign of nationwide success, given the absence of departments which do demand 
infrastructure and have not participated in the system. Further qualitative study is 
needed to asses why these 5 departments’ authorities’ were not willing or their 
teams unable to prioritize, design and carry out projects for infrastructure under this 
system. 
 
Through 308 projects registered as of December 2017, the system has 
already covered a wide variety of areas of public service, including Elementary and 
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higher Education, Transportation, Health and Sanitation, therefore helping Peru 
close its infrastructure gap, and cover basic needs of citizens in regions where these 
services are still under provided.  
 
Investment under the system only started to increase in a tangible way to the 
Peruvian society in 2013, only after the tax certificates of the system were made 
freely tradable. It was the possibility of trading the certificates what facilitated a 
greater flow of resources and a tangible increase in investment trends through the 
system. 
 
Participating companies peaked at 37 per year in 2017, but are still mostly 
composed of major taxpayers financially able to choose among prioritized projects to 
align their interests with the public interest. As individual professionals and small 
businesses do advance their income tax and sales tax payments, nothing prevents 
the creation of a system for these smaller taxpayers to also participate and choose to 
forward their resources to pieces of infrastructure needed by their communities. A 
policy formula for broader participation would not only give them that opportunity but 
also further incentivize a culture of taxpaying and prevent any distortive and badly 
perceived distributional effect of the system putting only high profit generating 
companies in a position to exercise choice among projects and pay for them. Social 
equilibrium considerations must be further studied in this extreme of the system. This 
is increasingly important, now that it is confirmed that other countries not only are 
interested in the system but have replicated it. The first one was Colombia, in 201619. 
                                                
19 Official notes on the Colombian Works for Taxes initiative may be found at 
http://es.presidencia.gov.co/noticia/180316-Lista-seleccion-de-primeros-proyectos-de-Obras-por-Impuestos-para-
el-Posconflicto  
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Joint work by delegations of Peru and Colombia for the design of their system 
occurred under the international forum of the Pacific Alliance cooperation. 
 
The fast and unprecedented growth of this financial tool both for corporate 
social responsibility interests, company branding and positioning, and faster basic 
infrastructure delivery for Government entities has therefore been successful in 
terms of geographic reach and variety of services covered, but could still increase its 
contribution to the general infrastructure investment made in Peru if policies were 
promoted to facilitate the trading of tax certificates granted through the system, and if 
the demand for investment in social infrastructure experienced by smaller taxpayers 
was aggregated under some alternative system, for example funds to which they 
could contribute to collectively reach the necessary amounts for small or medium 
works.  
 
A pricing system, through which higher yielding CIPRL were issued, could 
promote expanded access of the system to far regions of Peru, not yet covered by it.  
This further adjustments to system should be in line with the Peruvian Constitutional 
framework on subsidiarity of state enterprise activities and therefore may not feature 
discount rates more favorable than market discount rates. Nevertheless, it could 
render a yield higher than what the current CIPRL does for any company 
participating in the system, which only sees its certificates adjusted by 2% annually, 
whatever the inflation is in Peru.  
 
If the system was designed to cover and unattended demand for infrastructure 
investment, a solution based on promoting further supply of private investment in 
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social infrastructure for public services seems to be a sound solution. And there 
could be levels of yield for the tax credits certificates that would be both in line with 
the Peruvian constitution regarding not competing on financial services with the 
private sector, and also promoting a broader market for these certificates and more 
projects under the system.    
  
Premium CIPRL certificates from Works for Taxes in uncovered regions could 
be designed and structured for far regions of Peru where data indicates that 
incentives are not yet sufficiently aligned. As CIPRL represent credits against taxes, 
the trading of higher yielding CIPRL could trigger a culture of higher income reporting 
and then give more transparency and better data to markets and the tax collection 
agency and governments.  
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